Search Results for: Michael Rea

Christ-Shaped Philosophy Project

WELCOME to a unique and ongoing project at the website of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, where we are featuring interactions with Paul Moser’s paper, “Christ-Shaped Philosophy: Wisdom and Spirit United.”

Abstract: Christian philosophy is a distinctive kind of philosophy owing to the special role it assigns to God in Christ. Much of philosophy focuses on concepts, possibilities, necessities, propositions, and arguments. This may be helpful as far as it goes, but it omits what is the distinctive focus of Christian philosophy: the redemptive power of God in Christ, available in human experience. Such power, of course, is not mere talk or theory. Even Christian philosophers tend to shy away from the role of divine power in their efforts toward Christian philosophy. The power in question goes beyond philosophical wisdom to the causally powerful Spirit of God, who intervenes with divine corrective reciprocity. It yields a distinctive religious epistemology and a special role for Christian spirituality in Christian philosophy. It acknowledges a goal of union with God in Christ that shapes how Christian philosophy is to be done, and the result should reorient such philosophy in various ways. No longer can Christian philosophers do philosophy without being, themselves, under corrective and redemptive inquiry by God in Christ. This paper takes its inspiration from Paul’s profound approach to philosophy in his letter to the Colossians. Oddly, this approach has been largely ignored even by Christian philosophers. We need to correct this neglect.

Read the full-text of Moser’s paper for FREE by accessing it here (readers might also be interested in the discussion on Moser’s “religious epistemology” in the Winter 2012 issue of Philosophia Christi).

PROJECT PURPOSE: For philosophers and theologians, we invite you to consider submitting a carefully-honed response to one aspect of Moser’s thesis and argument, whether by critiquing it, advancing it, applying and integrating it to various areas of philosophy, theology and spirituality, or even by articulating some practices conducive toward ‘doing’ Christ-shaped philosophy.

LENGTH: 1500-2000 total words. You are welcome to work with the Project Editor on length issues.

DEADLINE: TBD with editor/coordinator (see below).

Each month, we plan to feature at least one new contribution in this space

CONTRIBUTIONS

How Can You Contribute? 15 Suggestions

  1. Interact with the paper’s thesis on its own merit. Perhaps you might want to discuss an assumption, concept, claim, distinction, methodology, etc., in Paul’s paper.
  2. Do Christ-Shaped Philosophy. Instead of just talking about it, perhaps you would like to model how Christ-Shaped philosophy can be done regarding some carefully-honed topic, whether one that Paul has addressed or something else.
  3. Address how to do Christ-shaped philosophy, whether as a discussion focused on relevant prolegomena issues or concerning the practical processes or practices involved. Here, we welcome even just a proposal for the ‘how to.’
  4. Explain the theological assumptions of Christ-shaped philosophy and show how it contributes to this way of ‘doing’ philosophy.
  5. Contextualize Christ-shaped philosophy in view of other relevant works by Paul Moser. (Paul’s paper is a continuation of his work in earlier publications such as: his Faith and Philosophy paper, “On Jesus and Philosophy”; chapter 4, “Philosophy Revamped,” from his book The Elusive God; his “Introduction” to his edited book, Jesus and Philosophy. A goal here may include drawing an overall general  picture of his conception of ‘Christian philosophy’ from his relevant works).
  6. Envision what it might mean to do Christ-shaped philosophy as and for the church. What are the ecclesial factors and significance for Christ-shaped philosophy? What might be the epistemic significance of theological tradition for informing Christ-shaped philosophy?
  7. Develop how Christ-shaped philosophy might affect philosophy practices (e.g., teaching, dialogue/discourse, and writing/publishing in philosophy). If it does (re)shape practices, explain how it does to distinctively?
  8. Compare the approach and benefits of Christ-shaped philosophy with Analytic Theology. Are they interrelated? Are they addressing similar topics yet asking different questions?
  9. Convey what are the implications of Christ-shaped philosophy for philosophy as a professionalized and specialized discipline in the academy, whether of an analytic or continental variety. Does Christ-shaped philosophy defy that categorization?
  10. If Christ-shaped philosophy is not ‘respected’ or ‘taken seriously’ in the academy, should it be attempted in that context?
  11. Envision the vocation, moral-spiritual character development training and skills of a philosopher if Christ-shaped philosophy is true. Consider this especially in the context of the contemporary practice of analytic philosophy in academic environments. How might graduate work look different if Christ-shaped philosophy is a goal? How might the socialization process and factors of becoming a ‘philosopher’ look any different?
  12. Consider the purpose and outcomes of Christ-shaped philosophy for ‘doing’ Christian apologetics and theology. How might apologetics and theology work differ in relationship to ‘Christian philosophy’ work if Christ-shaped philosophy is true and enacted?
  13. Develop the value and development of Christ-shaped philosophy in conversation with ‘contemporary’ and ‘historical’ voices. Which voices might help advance or help assess Christ-shaped philosophy, whether these are theology, philosophy, or spirituality voices.
  14. Consider whether Christ-shaped philosophy can be a ‘synthesis’ posture/framework for doing philosophy as a Christian, whether one is working from Reformed Epistemology, Evidentialism, Post-Foundationalism, Covenant Epistemology, etc.
  15. Envision how the basic contours of Christ-shaped philosophy might be viewed as a model for Christians ‘doing scholarship,’ regardless of their discipline or area of specialization. How might it be address so-called ‘worldview integration’ issues?

Project Coordinator & Editor
Tedla G. Woldeyohannes
Department of Philosophy
Saint Louis University
Saint Louis, MO 63108

Project Developer & Overseer
Joseph E. Gorra, Consulting Editor, Philosophia Christi

Copy Editor Assistant
Dave Strobolakos

Alvin Plantinga’s New Argument Against Materialism

The Summer 2012 issue of Philosophia Christi showcases a noteworthy discussion between Alvin Planting and Michael Tooley regarding Plantinga’s “new argument against materialism.” We are grateful for their contributions and for Jeremy Evans‘ (SEBTS) guest editor work. In fact, here’s how he introduces this discussion:

Materialism is the rage these days, so much so that some Christian thinkers are shifting away from long-standing traditions on the relationship of the mind and body (dualism of some sort) to provide a more scientific vision of mind-body interaction and personal identity. In order to move this discussion forward Philosophia Christi invited Alvin Plantinga to advance some of his arguments made in his famous essay “An Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism,” drawing to the front some of the problems that materialism must address. In this entry, Plantinga focuses on some problems inherent to materialism pertaining to theories of belief formation, intentionality, and the undertakings of agents. In essence, Plantinga argues that if materialism is true (whether it be of a reductive or nonreductive type) then the usual connection between beliefs and intentions do not provide the causal story that is needed to account for a person’s undertaking some endeavor. If neither beliefs nor intentions are causally relevant to an agent’s undertakings, then, as Plantinga argues, this provides a strong argument against materialism. We invite the reader to inspect Plantinga’s entry in order to piece together the argument.

We also invited Michael Tooley to provide a materialist response to Plantinga. Tooley seemed especially suited for this discussion given his previous exchange with Plantinga in their excellent book, The Knowledge of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). In this entry, Tooley seeks to overcome what, he thinks, are misrepresentations of materialism by Plantinga—personal identity does not track bodily identity, or brain identity, or upper brain identity, so I am not identical with my body, or with my brain, or with my upper brain. After developing some necessary groundwork, Tooley argues that Plantinga’s new argument against materialism is unsound because it “fails to distinguish, first of all, between mere physical movement on the one hand, and genuine, intentional action on the other, and secondly, between the causation of mere physical movement on the one hand, and the explanation of genuine intentional action on the other. Subsequent to this argument Tooley then advances what is, in his opinion, the strongest form of materialism and why Plantinga’s argument does not address it. In his second article, Plantinga offers a response to this critique.

You can purchase the Summer 2012 issue or become a subscriber to the journal or a member of the EPS and receive this issue as part of your membership.

On Communitarianism: An Interview with Ken Grasso

Communitarianism often informs much of our Western theologies and philosophies of community, society, and notions of social harmony. How might we understand it as a movement of thought?

In this interview with Ken Grasso, we discuss the various nuances of ‘communitarianism,’ and how a robust anthropology might be a corrective to ‘political communitarianism,’ yet also help to advance a kind of ‘social communitarianism’ that is meaningful for a pluralist theory of society.

Grasso is professor of political science at Texas State University.  He has written extensively on Catholic social thought, the liberal tradition, and democratic theory.

Here are some excerpts from our interview:

As you know, ‘communitarianism’ is a rather heterogeneous movement of associated thinkers that seems united around a common conviction of what they are against: a radical individualism inspired by some variety political liberalism. What’s at the heart of this liberalism?

A vision of human beings as sovereign wills free to make of themselves and the world whatever they choose, unbound by moral ties antecedent to choice save perhaps for the duty to respect the autonomy of others.  This vision of the person issues a thin theory of society in which human social relations are understood as artificial, external, and contractual; and in which human communities are viewed as temporary aggregations of individuals united for reasons of mutual utility. 

So, communitarianism is a ‘reactive’ movement?

Communitarianism must be understood as an effort to address the modern crisis of community, the decline of community that seems to happen as an outgrowth of those socioeconomic changes that together constitute modernization.  The loss of community – and resulting sense of isolation, alienation, etc. — is one of the defining cultural experiences of modernity.  One cannot but think in this context about contemporary concerns about the erosion of our sense of civic solidarity and social connectedness, and decline of the institutions composing civil society.  

What are the historical and contemporary varieties of communitarianism that you have identified in your scholarship?

Obviously, community can mean very different things and there are many types of communitarianism.  I would say that the basic distinction in the modern world is between what might be called “political” and what might be called “social” communitarianism.  The former has historically received expression in the thought of thinkers like Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, and in American context the thought of certain of the progressives such as Herbert Croly.   It receives contemporary expression in the writings of thinkers like Robert Bellah, William Sullivan, Michael Sandel, Amitai Etzoni and Alan Wolfe. 

What defines what I’m calling political communitarianism is a vision of social life which focuses single-mindedly on the individual and the state, and whose effect is to make the state the center of social life, and the political community the locus of community.  Social communitarianism, in contrast, historically finds expression in the writings of thinkers like Althusius, Tocqueville, Durkheim and Burke as well as in modern Catholic and neo-Calvinist social thought (where it finds expression in the social teachings of the modern popes as well as in the thought of such figures as Heinrich Rommen, Jacques Maritain, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd.  In post-World War II America, it finds expression in the writings of thinkers like Mary Ann Glendon, Robert Nisbet, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Jean Bethke Elshtain. 

What’s important to social communitarians?

For social communitarians, our nature as social beings finds expression in a wide variety of diverse institutions and social groups in society, as to be seen not as an aggregation of individuals united by citizenship in the political community, but as a community of communities.   From this perspective, the state is not the primary institution in which our nature as social beings finds expression, and the polis is not the locus of community.  For it, the institutions of civil society, rather than the state, are the center, as it were, of social gravity. 

Does political communitarianism represent a dead end?

Yes. It is incapable of addressing the modern world’s crisis of community because both its theory and practice are destructive of the small-scale, highly personal, solidaristic institutions which are alone capable of addressing our need for community.  At the same time, its celebration of state power is endangers liberty in its foundations.  Only in social communitarianism can we find the resources to both revitalize community and secure liberty.

  You can read the full text of this interview by clicking here.

Philosophia Christi Summer 2012 Issue

The Summer 2012 issue (vol. 14, no. 1) leads with a unique and stimulating discussion between Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley about Plantinga’s “new argument against materialism.” In addition, other contributions include the following:

  • Nathan Jacobsasks, “Are Created Spirits Composed of Matter and Form?” and offers a defense of “Pneumatic Hylomorphism.”
  • Stewart Goetzcritiques N.T. Wright’s critique of dualism.
  • Esther Meekcontrasts Michael Polanyi and Alvin Plantinga’s contributions to epistemology.
  • Christian Miller and Cristian Mihutcontribute to discussions on forgiveness, resentment, and virtue ethics.
  • John Jefferson Davisaddresses the challenge of inter-religious epistemologies in the Christian-Buddhist discussion.
  • Charles Taliaferro discusses the significance of thought experiments in Derek Parfit’s work.
  • Kirk MacGregordiscusses the irrelevance of gratuitous evil.
…. and many more wonderful book reviews, important news about upcoming journal themes, and news about great fellowships and conferences!
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A Brief Sketch on Courage

An Ongoing Series of Sketches from the Contributors of Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, co-edited by Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett (Eerdmans, 2012). More info can be found at www.beinggoodnews.com.

Using the thought of Thomas Aquinas, this chapter on courage explores similarities and differences between heroic or ‘action-adventure’ models of courage and the virtue of courage as exemplified in the person of Jesus Christ.

Courage is the virtue concerned with standing firm against fear for the sake of some good that we love. When faced with danger, we typically react with a “fight” or “flight” response—reactions Aquinas calls “daring” and “fear.” If we lack sufficient daring and give in to fear, we can fall prey to the vice of cowardice. For example, in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter books, character Peter Pettigrew is a coward because he betrays his best friends to save his own skin. While it is right and good to value our own lives, the courageous person recognizes that this is neither the greatest nor the only good. Peter’s case shows us that courage is necessary for a flourishing life, even if that life involves risk, difficulty, and self-sacrifice. He stays alive, to be sure, only to live on as a morally deformed person whose relationships of love have been destroyed by fear.

Courage requires training the passions of fear and daring to serve the good. This virtue mobilizes daring to attack what threatens (aggression) and moderates fears that might otherwise prompt us to give way under threat (endurance). Thus it can be expressed in two ways. Courageous aggression is called for when we are strong enough to overcome. Courageous endurance, by contrast, is needed when we stand in a position of weakness: either we cannot overcome the threat with force or our own power, as the aggressive person does, or we cannot escape without betraying the good to which we must remain faithful.  In these cases, endurance is the only means of holding firmly to the good we love. To picture the paradigmatic act of endurance, Aquinas offers us the example of the Christian martyr, whose sacrifice imitates (in part) the courageous sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The martyr endures even the greatest threat (death) for the sake of her greatest love (God).  Thus her love for God must be stronger even than her fear of death. Her courage is grounded in power of love, not her own physical strength or ability to overcome evil. As Augustine says, “Courage is love enduring all things for the sake of the Beloved.”

Fictional characters illustrate the different expressions of courage and its opposing vices. The heroes of American action-adventure films typically valorize courageous aggression. The independent and self-sufficient protagonist typically relies on his own strength in order to safeguard what’s good. But the shadow side of this model of courage is a temptation to an idolatrous kind of self-confidence, in which we deny our dependence on God’s power and trust our own power instead, and in which we forget that love is the type of power God wielded in the face of ultimate evil. The United States’ unprecedented military, technological, and economic power, and its cultural value of autonomy make us more vulnerable to this temptation than we might suspect. In the Harry Potter books, heroes like James, Sirius, and Harry himself engage in many noble acts of courageous aggression, while Voldemort illustrates the dark side of human power taken to its furthest extreme. Voldemort loves only himself and his own life; therefore he fears death above all else. His resulting prideful quest is to conquer death and become invulnerable by maximizing his own power—in a word, by becoming God-like.
In the climax of the series, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, Harry and his mother Lily show us a contrary picture of Christlikeness, a picture of courageous love for another whose power is even stronger than the fear of death. In a fictional echo of the cross, Harry pursues the way of self-giving love, not the way of selfishly wielded supernatural power: he puts away his wand (symbolizing his own power) and lays down his life for his friends (John 15: 13). His mother’s love sustains him and his friends surround him—a picture of the communion of the saints. His vulnerability stands in stark contrast with Voldemort’s quest for invulnerability; Harry is a mere teenager, and his mother is an unarmed woman. Their courage is born of their love for others; they stand firm even in death, faithful to that good. As such, they offer us a picture of courage as endurance, and a model of Christian love for God.

Rather than unreflectively endorsing a restricted masculine ideal of human physical strength and ingenuity, or encouraging us toward an idolatrous reliance on human power, the Christian conception of courage reminds us of the power of love, a power made possible, even made perfect, in weakness.

Future issues, inquiries, and projects:

How do the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love transform our understanding and practice of the other moral virtues?

How can we develop of practices and communities of practice that encourage conceptions of distinctively Christian virtues, even when this is counter-cultural?

How is courageous endurance a more inclusive model than heroic aggression, from a feminist perspective? Are there also dangers here: for example, how should morally appropriate cases of self-sacrifice be distinguished from unhealthy and abusive models, especially within church culture?

A Brief Sketch On Compassion

An Ongoing Series of Sketches from the Contributors of Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, co-edited by Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett (Eerdmans, 2012). More info can be found at www.beinggoodnews.com.

Compassion is in. Celebrities champion compassionate causes. Bono, U2’s lead singer, has been instrumental in bringing attention and aid to those in Africa who suffer deeply due to grinding poverty, AIDS, and unfair trade policies. Other celebrities such as Julia Roberts, George Clooney, and Tom Brady have joined in this fight through their involvement with the ONE campaign.

A Christian account of compassion will focus on the sick and the poor. our moral exemplar in this regard is of course Jesus Himself, who was moved with compassion at the suffering of those He encountered in His earthly ministry (Matthew 9:35-37; Mark 6:30-44). However, compassion will also be relevant to our relationships with family, friends, and others who are perhaps suffering in other ways.

Many of us tend to think of compassionate actions as good things to do, but not in the sense that we are morally required to do them. We often think of compassionate acts, especially as they relate to the poor, as supererogatory acts of charity.[1] My claim is that exemplifying the virtue of compassion in our everyday lives is a matter of justice, rather than an optional matter of charity. The basic reason that compassion is an obligatory matter of justice, apart from the biblical injunctions, is that human beings have great value as image-bearers of God. Genesis 1:27 states that humans are created “in the image of God”, but what does this mean? A variety of answers have been given to this question, but for our purposes, it is enough to point out that being made in God’s image means that we are God’s representatives, and that we are representational of who God is.[2] We are free, relational, morally responsible, self-conscious beings. We reflect and represent who God is as human persons made in His image. God is the locus of ultimate value, and we, as human beings created in His image and to reflect His character, share in that value. This has important implications for ethics generally, and the virtue of compassion specifically. Given that all human beings are made in the image of God, all human beings possess a basic dignity, a fundamental value such that they have a conditional right to have their basic needs met.[3] Hence, in some contexts, especially when a person’s basic needs are at stake, showing compassion is an obligatory matter of justice rather than an optional matter of charity. Or so I believe.

Interestingly, the term “compassionate” has a verb form. Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) was an influential British pastor, theologian, and philosopher, and his writings still receive the attention of philosophers today. In a sermon on compassion, Butler observes that when we

rejoice in the prosperity of others, and compassionate their distresses, we, as it were, substitute them for ourselves, their interest for our own; and have the same kind of pleasure in their prosperity and sorrow in their distress, as we have…upon our own.[4] 

This quotation from Butler is pregnant with meaning and insight, but note how he speaks of compassion. We are to compassionate the distresses of others. True compassion includes assisting others who are in distress.[5] For Butler, as for Christ, compassion necessarily involves action.

As an action that we engage in, compassion often involves sacrifice. Perhaps it requires that we give up some of our comfort, our time, or our talent. As Butler pointed out, it involves taking the distress of others to be as significant as our own distress. As such, it involves a turning away from what philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) called “the dear self”.[6] We often find self-love at the bottom of much of our actions that otherwise appear to be morally right. This can also be true regarding acts of compassion. However, even if this is descriptively true of human beings and our motives, this does not count against the claim that we ought to act out of a genuine and unselfish concern for others. Nor does it entail that we shouldn’t seek to take the flourishing of others to be as or more important than our own. This is demanding, to be sure, but it remains within our reach, not only as we seek to alleviate the distresses of the poor and the sick, but also those closest to us.

Further Work: Questions:

  • The claim that compassion is in some sense a duty, or that others have a right to our compassion at least sometimes, is controversial. What arguments for and against such a claim are there, expanding on the suggestion above that human dignity as bearers of the image of God justifies such a claim?
  • How do we engage in self-deception which undermines compassion? What sorts of practices at the individual and community level foster the development of compassion?
  • In what ways is compassion relevant to the parent-child relationship? Marriage? Friendship? Employer-employee? Teacher-student? Believer in Christ-non-believer?

Michael W. Austin

Eastern Kentucky University

A Brief Sketch On Zeal

An Ongoing Series of Sketches from the Contributors of Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, co-edited by Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett (Eerdmans, 2012). More info can be found at www.beinggoodnews.com.

Many are reluctant to identify zeal as a virtue. This is understandable, as zeal is frequently abused and easily confused. Acts of terrorism and brands of “Crusader zeal” shape our understanding of what it is. As a result, we tend to see zeal as vicious rather than virtuous, and to regard the actions of ‘zealots’ as universally bad. But is there something wrong with zeal as such?

The answer of this chapter is “no.” In fact, we argue, zeal is a good trait of character, a virtue. Certainly, some forms and expressions of zeal are bad and need to be condemned. But Scripture and history indicate that there is far more to the story. Jesus himself is lauded for zealously stewarding the purposes of God, and, in New Testament passages of particular ethical importance, Paul and Peter explicitly commend zeal for Jesus’ followers. Later Christian luminaries like William Wilberforce and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. embodied zeal in working for justice and equality in their day. In these and other cases, zeal plays a crucial role in the morally excellent character and behavior of God’s people.

In this chapter, we develop a conception of zeal as a virtue, both theologically and philosophically, beginning with an account of zeal as reflected in Scripture. In Romans 12, which we examine in particular detail, the ethical framework in which zeal is commended is teleological in the classical sense: an orientation toward the pursuit of good (what is supremely valuable and excellent) as an end (telos) that is “perfective” of the agent. In fact, Paul strikingly casts God’s will in classically teleological terms (v. 2), as the good, pleasing, and perfect object of pursuit. In light of the strenuous difficulty of pursuing this good, a passionateresponse is required: zeal.

Understood within the context of Romans 12 and other passages, however, such a response has clear parameters; it is rationally guided by an accurate, transformed vision of reality, and motivated by and oriented toward love. We define biblical zeal, on this basis, as a disposition to pursue what is good – rationally, fervently, and diligently, motivated by and expressed in love.

We refine this conception by analyzing zeal’s opposing vices. On the one hand, our pursuit of what is good goes bad when it is excessive, to the tune of fanaticism, and/or when it is misdirected – with respect to the end sought, the means employed, or both. These forms of “bad zeal” give zeal its bad reputation; in reality, however, they are competitors to zeal, properly understood. Opposing zeal on the other hand is a disposition where passionate pursuit of what is good is deficient – the vice of sloth, one of the “seven deadly sins.” This latter condition, in our view, is the more common failure among followers of Jesus (like us) these days. To glorify God and grow in Christlikeness, we need zeal.

Like other virtues, zeal needs to be cultivated. In this chapter, we make a number of suggestions for developing zeal, including Sabbath rest, meditation on God’s goodness, community, the Holy Spirit, and practical acts of service.

But there is far more to this underrated and misunderstood virtue than we are able to develop here. For the reader who is properly zealous for zeal, several themes merit yet further exploration. Here are three suggestions, as a start. First, zeal tends to be associated with extraordinary passion and action. But feats that call for such response are rare. We need greater understanding of how zeal may be reflected and developed in the context of ordinary action as well.

Second, as with other considerations of action and virtue, whether ordinary or extraordinary, we need a mature and robust picture of the role of the Holy Spirit in the development and expression of zeal. What does cooperating with the Holy Spirit involve in this case? How do we understand his agency in relation to ours? Where do our actions, such as practicing spiritual disciplines, fit into the process of cultivating zeal? Zeal is an important part of the morally praiseworthy life for followers of Jesus, but the ultimate source of biblical zeal (and other virtues) is God, not us. We err when we try to generate such passion in our own efforts rather than let such passion be fanned into flame by the Spirit (Romans 12:11).

A final area for further consideration concerns how we might ally zeal with the other virtues – particularly courage. Biblical zeal helps renew our mind and align our will to fervently pursue the purposes of God. But hindrances and challenges dot the way; courage is needed to overcome and continue in passionate pursuit. How then do courage and zeal relate to each other – conceptually, biblically, developmentally? There is plenty of room here for fruitful interdisciplinary work between philosophers, theologians, and psychologists.

David Horner & David Turner

Biola University

Ontology of Intentionality

With this post, I continue my blog series on the ontology of knowledge.

What kind of thing is intentionality?

For one, I don’t see how it could be a relation. If it were, then any time I have a thought about something, even Pegasus, Pegasus would have to pop into existence, lest there not be a relation. So, most philosophers realize intentionality is a property of “mental states,” whatever those end up being ontologically (so as to not beg any questions here). Fred Dretske & Michael Tye, e.g., two naturalists, realize this is so.

But, as a property of things like thoughts, beliefs, & experiences (at least of those kinds that are used to make observations), what kinds of features do intentional states have?

First, here’s a quality they DON’T have: there is NOT a necessary connection between thoughts, beliefs, or experiences of an object and the object itself. A mental act’s mere “ofness” is not sufficient, for we can think about many things, including possible states of affairs, without them having to obtain in reality (e.g., Pegasus; if my glasses are on my desk at home (and they aren’t); etc.). The latter case parallels those in scientific testing, where we form a hypothesis and test for its accuracy.

Conversely, the existence of an object does not entail that there would be any thoughts or experiences of it. Their connection, therefore, is NOT existential, thereby undermining causal chain accounts, such as those proposed by Tye, in which intentionality just is causal correlation between an external, real object and our “mental” states which are “of” this object under optimal conditions. For him, mental states are just a way of describing brain states.

Positively, there are at least three key, even essential, features of intentional states:

  1. They are particularized. Consider my thought about tonight’s dinner, or my experience of being seated in Starbuck’s. What they are of is not generic or undifferentiated. In each case, their intentionality is directed “toward” some intended “object.” 
  2. These mental states necessarily have intentionality. It does not seem we could have a thought, belief, or an experience in making an observation that lacks it. 
  3. They also seem to be intrinsic, or essential, to each mental state. My thought about tonight’s dinner could not be about anything else and still be the thought it is. I could observe a gas’s behavior, but that experience could not have been of my being seated. So, how do we best explain these three essential features of intentional states?

On Open-Mindedness

Jason Baehr, Associate Professor, Loyola Marymount University, offer the following contribution in an ongoing series of sketches from contributors of Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, co-edited by Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett (Eerdmans, 2012). More info can be found at www.beinggoodnews.com.

On Open-Mindedness

Many Christians are wary of open-mindedness. They worry that it amounts to a kind of intellectual wishy-washiness, cowardice, or foolishness. But these misgivings about open-mindedness betray a misunderstanding of its basic nature and structure. In its most basic form, open-mindedness is a willingness and ability to transcend a certain way of thinking in order to “take up” or “take seriously” some distinct way of thinking. And it is rooted in or flows from a “love” of epistemic goods like knowledge, truth, and understanding.

When conceived of in this way, Christians have good reason to think of open-mindedness as an intellectual excellence or virtue. It comports well with the value that the Old and New Testaments place on truth and wisdom. It is obviously useful in the context of education and in “intramural” theological disputes. And it fits well with—and indeed may be required by—the kind of neighbor-love, enemy-love, and humility that Christians are called to by Jesus himself.

A question remains whether Christians should be open-minded about matters pertaining to their own Christian faith. Arguably they should, since the alternative would amount to being intellectually dishonest. That said, there limits on the sort of open-mindedness that can reasonably be expected of Christians. For instance, they can be expected to, say, modify or give up one of their Christian beliefs only if, from a settled, all-things-considered perspective, the evidence demands it.

Becoming open-minded is not a matter of direct or immediate choice. Rather, it requires intentionality, placing oneself in certain environments and avoiding others, self-reflection, and, for the Christian in particular, a rich and meaningful spiritual life.

Issues for further inquiry:

  1. The chapter provides some indication of when or with respect to what beliefs or ideas it is appropriate to be open-minded. But much more could be explored and said along these lines. For instance, exactly what considerations govern when an exercise of open-mindedness would be intellectually virtuous and why?
  2. It is fairly obvious that many Christians could do a better job of being (appropriately) open-minded in the context of public debate or discussion with persons with whom they disagree. Here as well it can be asked: when, in the context of public debate, is open-mindedness called for? How can and should it be balanced with other virtues like intellectual courage? And what exactly would greater open-mindedness look like in this context? The articulation of some guiding principles on these matters would be illuminating and practically beneficial.
  3. There is something paradoxical about the idea that a person might have distinctively Christian reasons for altering or even giving up one of her Christian beliefs. For it looks as though, once she gives up the belief, she might lose the very reasons she had for doing so! On the other hand, it seems unreasonable (for reasons discussed in the chapter) to think that Christians should only be open-minded about their non- or a-Christian beliefs. How, then, can we make sense of these competing considerations?
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